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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal presents us with the question of whether the 
doctrine of unclean hands can be applied to deny relief to 
a landlord-creditor when the Bankruptcy Court has held 
the landlord-creditor's Proofs of Claim were not related to 
the events giving rise to the assertion of unclean hands. 
 
In this case, the Bankruptcy Court held that the alleged 
"unclean hands" did not bar the claims for relief sought by 
the landlord-creditor, Corporate Property Associates 
("CPA"). The District Court for the District of New Jersey 
reversed that determination and denied all relief to CPA. 
 
We agree with the Bankruptcy Court that the challenged 
actions taken by CPA did not relate to the matters for 
which CPA sought payments under its leases, and that the 
Proofs of Claim filed by CPA did no more than reserve CPA's 
rights, which were controverted by the lessee, New Valley 
Corporation ("New Valley"). Accordingly, we will reverse the 
district court's Order dated July 13, 1998, denying relief to 
CPA, and remand to the district court so that it may resolve 
the remaining issues raised by the parties in their 




The district court had appellate jurisdiction over the final 
order of the Bankruptcy Court, dated January 26, 1998 
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which followed from its opinion of December 23, 1997, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(a). 
 
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 158(d) and 
28 U.S.C. S 1291 over the final order of the district court, 
dated July 13, 1998, which dismissed the claims of CPA 
against New Valley. CPA filed a timely Notice of Appeal on 




In November, 1981, CPA1 purchased properties in Reno, 
Nevada; Moorestown, New Jersey and Bridgeton, Missouri, 
from the Western Union Realty Corporation. The Western 
Union Telegraph Company had been the tenant of the 
properties, which had been owned by Western Union Realty 
Corporation. 
 
In December 1981, Western Union Telegraph Company 
changed its name to Western Union Corporation ("WUC"). 
WUC continued to be the tenant of record of the properties. 
In August, 1989, Western Union Financial Services, Inc. 
(formerly a division of WUC) ("FSI") was spun off as a 
wholly-owned corporate subsidiary. Two years later, in 
April, 1991, WUC changed its name to New Valley 
Corporation. 
 
On March 15, 1990, Donald Wasson, Director of Real 
Estate Operations for New Valley,2 faxed proposed "Consent 
to Assignment" forms (the "Consents") to Barclay Jones, 
then Vice President of CPA.3 The cover letter to the 
proposed consent forms stated that as a result of Western 
Union's corporate restructuring, New Valley wished"to 
assign its lease[s]" to FSI for the Bridgeton and Reno 
properties. The proposed Consents concerned only the 
Bridgeton and Reno properties. No attempt was made by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. There are actually two entities involved as appellees, CPA 2 and CPA 
3, which will be referred to collectively as "CPA." 
 
2. Although, as indicated, WUC did not change its name until April 
1991, "New Valley" will be used throughout in the interest of clarity. 
 
3. CPA's brief identifies Jones as Vice President of CPA's "general 
partner." Because no further identification of CPA's general partner 
appears in the record, we refer to Jones as CPA's Vice President. 
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New Valley to assign the Moorestown, New Jersey lease. 
New Valley asked that CPA execute the Consents. 
 
CPA took no immediate action on the two proposed 
Consents. About a month later, however, Wasson and 
Jones had a telephone conversation in which Jones stated 
that CPA would not agree to any assignments unless the 
Moorestown lease was also assigned by New Valley to FSI. 
Wasson replied that New Valley did not want to assign the 
Moorestown lease, as a decision had already been made by 
New Valley to abandon Moorestown. FSI had already been 
operating out of the Bridgeton and Reno properties, 
whereas New Valley had already moved much of its 
operation out of Moorestown. Wasson confirmed his 
impression that CPA had not agreed to the assignment of 
the Bridgeton and Reno leases in an internal April 12, 1990 
memorandum. Jones testified at trial that there had been 
no meeting of the minds with regard to the assignments of 
the leases. 
 
No discussions were held between the parties on the 
issue of the assignments until May, 1993. On May 18, 
1993, CPA faxed to New Valley what were purported to be 
executed "Consent to Assignment" forms for the Bridgeton 
and Reno leases. New Valley was already in bankruptcy by 
that date. In a letter from New Valley to CPA's counsel, 
dated September 8, 1993, New Valley stated that it"flatly 
dispute[d]" CPA's execution of the proposed Consents. New 
Valley had no record of the fully executed "Consent to 
Assignment" forms in its files. CPA responded with a letter 
on September 30, 1993, stating that New Valley's position 
reflected only a "creative bankruptcy solution" that was 
intended to shield FSI from liability. 
 
On October 4, 1993, John C. Walters, a Senior Vice 
President of New Valley, sent a letter to CPA in order to 
clarify the situation involving the Bridgeton and Reno 
leases. The letter stated that "[w]hile FSI admittedly has 
operated out of the Bridgeton and Reno sites since it 
became operational in 1990, it has done so pursuant to an 
agreement with New Valley . . . which obligates FSI to 
reimburse New Valley for its pro rata share of the expenses. 
. . ." Walters noted that New Valley had wanted to assign 
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the leases to FSI in 1990, but that it believed it could not 
do so without CPA's approval. 
 
The Consents that were forwarded by CPA on May 18, 
1993, had been signed on behalf of CPA by Jones, but they 
were dated April 15, 1990. Jones was named as "Executive 
Vice President," a title that he in fact did not attain until 
approximately a year after the purported execution date. 
The date the Consents were executed, April 15, 1990, also 
happened to be the date of Easter Sunday. New Valley at 
trial presented evidence that the Consents could not have 
been executed on April 15, 1990, and the Bankruptcy 
Court credited this evidence. At trial, Jones testified that 
although he recalled signing the Consents, he could not 
recall whether he signed them on Easter Sunday, 1990. 
 
In addition, there was evidence that, even after the 
purported date of the assignments (April 15, 1990), CPA 
was aware that New Valley in fact remained the tenant of 
Bridgeton and Reno. For example, Jones testified that, in 
September 1991, CPA sent a letter to New Valley 
announcing a rent increase. Further, CPA accountants 
requested information from New Valley in December 1991 
and again in December 1994 relating to the tenancy of 




The instant litigation commenced on November 15, 1991, 
when an involuntary Chapter 11 petition was filed against 
New Valley. New Valley consented to an entry of an order 
for relief under Chapter 11 on March 30, 1993. 
 
In April, 1993, New Valley moved before the Bankruptcy 
Court to reject the Moorestown lease. At about the same 
time, New Valley moved to extend the deadline to assess 
whether to reject the leases for Bridgeton and Reno. On 
May 24, 1993, the Bankruptcy Court approved the rejection 
of the Moorestown lease. Although initially CPA objected to 
the extension of the deadline sought by New Valley, it 
withdrew its objection because, it alleged, these leases 
[Bridgeton and Reno] may have been assigned to FSI. 
 
As earlier mentioned, on May 18, 1993, in support of its 
argument that the Bridgeton and Reno leases had been 
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assigned to FSI, CPA faxed copies of what were purported 
to be fully executed "Consent to Assignment" forms for 
those leases. On September 8, 1993, New Valley wrote to 
CPA and stated that it was New Valley's understanding that 
the leases had not been assigned. In its September 30, 
1993 letter, CPA implied that whether the leases had been 
assigned informally or de facto was a question best resolved 
through litigation. 
 
Also on September 30, 1993, CPA filed its first Proof of 
Claim with the Bankruptcy Court. With respect to the 
Bridgeton and Reno leases, CPA contended that 
 
       [a]lthough the [Bridgeton and Reno] leases were 
       assigned and assumed by [FSI], a non-debtor 
       subsidiary of [New Valley], because [New Valley] has 
       taken the position in this bankruptcy case that the two 
       leases were not assigned, [CPA] ha[s] included these 
       amounts in its Proof of Claim as a precautionary 
       measure. [CPA] hereby reserve[s] the right to argue that 
       the Bridgeton and Reno leases were in fact assigned to 
       and assumed by FSI. 
 
CPA included an almost identical reservation of rights in its 
second Proof of Claim, which was filed on January 20, 
1995. This second Proof of Claim was concerned only with 
Reno, and was evidently filed to reflect additional 
information. The Bankruptcy Court approved New Valley's 
rejection of the Reno lease in December 1994. 
 
After extensive discovery and briefing, the Bankruptcy 
Court resolved some rental issues in an order dated 
October 29, 1996, on the parties' cross-motions for 
summary judgment on New Valley's objections to the Proofs 
of Claim. Those matters not resolved on motions proceeded 
to trial on issues relating only to the Reno and Moorestown 
properties. CPA's claims concerning Bridgeton had been 
settled before trial, and CPA's claims regarding Bridgeton 
were withdrawn with prejudice in June, 1997. 
 
The trial, which was held in July, 1997, took eight days 
to complete. The Bankruptcy Court determined that CPA's 
statements in its Proofs of Claim -- and its similar 
statements in January 1996 in a response to New Valley's 
Request for Admissions and Interrogatories -- did not 
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constitute admissions by CPA of its belief that the leases 
had been assigned. Rather, the Bankruptcy Court held that 
CPA did not have sufficient information to determine 
whether the leases had been assigned or not. 
 
On December 23, 1997, the Bankruptcy Court issued an 
opinion in favor of CPA. The Bankruptcy Court, after 
deducting certain amounts from CPA's claims, awarded 
CPA a total of $2,888,469.30 in unpaid rent and other costs.4 
Approximately $824,000.00 of this amount was attributable 
to the Reno lease, and the remainder ($2,056,469.30) was 
attributable to the Moorestown lease.5  
 
The Bankruptcy Court explicitly found that CPA's 
conduct regarding the assignments of the Bridgeton and 
Reno leases did not merit disallowance of its claims. 
Although the Bankruptcy Court was "wholly unconvinced" 
that CPA actually believed that the Bridgeton and Reno 
leases had been assigned, nevertheless it found"no impact 
on the proofs of claim . . . since the alleged assignments did 
not bear on any element of the proof[s] of claim. Without 
more, they are not sufficient circumstantial evidence that 
CPA concocted an inflated claim. Rather, it appears to have 
been a somewhat misguided effort to preserve a right 
against FSI in the event CPA was unlikely to be paid in the 
New Valley case."6 Further, the Bankruptcy Court agreed 
with New Valley that it was "likely that the Consents were 
backdated and then produced to avoid the prospect of being 
limited to a lease rejection claim in the New Valley  
bankruptcy."7 
 
The Bankruptcy Court concluded that CPA's conduct 
with regard to a claim against FSI arising out of the alleged 
assignments, was not dispositive of its claims against New 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. CPA had claimed a total due from New Valley of $3,499,084.84. 
 
5. We note that these figures, employed by CPA in its brief, add up to 
$2,880,469.30, while the Bankruptcy Court, as noted in text, awarded 
CPA a total of $2,888,469.30. This discrepancy is not explained by the 
parties. The discrepancy, however, does not affect our disposition of this 
appeal. 
 
6. Bankruptcy Court Op. at 41. 
 
7. Id. at 25. 
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Valley. "If the court had before it an objection by FSI to a 
CPA claim the issues surrounding execution of the 
Consents would be directly pertinent." However, as the 
claims at issue were against New Valley, and not FSI, CPA's 
conduct did not warrant having its claims disallowed. 
 
Both parties appealed to the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey. While both raised a number of 
issues, the district court ruled only on the issue of unclean 
hands, raised by New Valley. The other issues, it decided, 
were rendered moot by its decision.8 
 
The district court reversed the Bankruptcy Court's 
determination on the grounds that the Bankruptcy Court 
had "abused its discretion . . . because [it] applied the 
wrong legal principle." The district court did not dispute 
that the Bankruptcy Court did in fact have discretion to 
refuse to apply the unclean hands doctrine. 
 
Specifically, the district court, relying upon Gaudiosi v. 
Mellon, 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 
(1959), concluded that the Bankruptcy Court, by failing to 
apply the unclean hands doctrine, did not follow the law of 
this Circuit. Rather, the district court concluded that the 
doctrine of unclean hands should be applied to protect the 
integrity of the court itself, regardless of whether the 
unclean hands of a creditor injured a party and regardless 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In addition to the issue of unclean hands, New Valley appealed the 
Bankruptcy Court's evidentiary ruling regarding CPA's alleged 
admissions, and its ruling that CPA's claim for rent for the Moorestown 
property was not subject to 11 U.S.C. S 502(b)(6)'s mandatory cap. 
 
CPA appealed 1) the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court that its deferred 
maintenance costs were capped under section 502(b)(6); 2) the 
calculation of the section 502(b)(6) cap; 3) the determination of the 
reasonable rental rate for Moorestown; 4) the exclusion of CPA's claim 
for the cost of retaining maintenance; and 5) the Bankruptcy Court's 
determination of the effective rejection date for the Moorestown lease. 
 
Because the district court held that all of CPA's claims were barred by 
CPA's "unclean hands," it did not reach or decide the appeals taken with 
regard to the other issues decided by the Bankruptcy Court. We have no 
occasion to address those issues either, as the only question before us 
is whether the district court erred in holding that CPA's unclean hands 
barred it from relief. 
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of the presence of any immediate and necessary 
relationship between the claims before the court and the 
events giving rise to the assertion of unclean hands. The 
district court then held that CPA's conduct involving the 
Consents amounted to unclean hands and therefore it 
disallowed CPA's claims. 
 
The district court did not hold that the Bankruptcy 
Court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. However, 
while crediting the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact, the 
district court concluded that CPA had fabricated evidence 
(i.e., the executed Consents) and had advocated before the 
Bankruptcy Court a theory of assignment that it knew not 
to be true. The district court also questioned the testimony 
that Jones gave before the Bankruptcy Court. Predicated on 
its own analysis, and drawing upon selected findings made 
by the Bankruptcy Court, the district court then concluded, 
contrary to the conclusion reached by the Bankruptcy 
Court, that CPA's conduct did have an immediate and 
necessary relationship with CPA's claims against New 
Valley. 
 
The district court closed its opinion with the observation 
that "this Court must hold corporations responsible for 
their misconceived and improper conduct. Corporate ethics, 
professionalism, and verity are not lost on this Court, and 
when corporations denigrate these values through lack of 
candor . . . this Court will not countenance this type of 
conduct . . . [and will cause it] to apply the appropriate 
punishment." The district court's "appropriate punishment" 
here consisted of barring all relief to CPA, thereby denying 
CPA the $2,888,469.30 which the Bankruptcy Court had 
determined was due from New Valley. 
 




In bankruptcy proceedings, we have determined that an 
abuse of discretion exists when "the [trial] court's decisions 
rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to 
fact." In re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 
470 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Here, as the district 
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court did not question the Bankruptcy Court's findings of 
fact, it concluded that the Bankruptcy Court had abused 
its discretion in not applying the unclean hands doctrine on 
the basis of an incorrect conclusion of law. 
 
This court reviews findings of fact by the Bankruptcy 
Court under a clearly erroneous standard, and its 
conclusions of law under a plenary standard. In re Visual 
Indus., Inc., 57 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 1995). Because the 
district court sits as an appellate court in bankruptcy 
cases, our review of the district court's decision is plenary. 
Id. at 324. See also Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. 
Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1223 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
CPA frames the issue as whether the Bankruptcy Court, 
"which presided over the lengthy proceedings and trial in 
this matter, abused its discretion in declining to apply" 
unclean hands. CPA referred us to Castle v. Cohen, 676 F. 
Supp. 620 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd in part and remanded on 
other grounds, 840 F.2d 173 (3d Cir. 1988), 9 which had 
declined to apply the unclean hands doctrine to trustees of 
an employee stock ownership plan. In doing so, CPA 
identified five elements that must be present to warrant 
application of unclean hands against a party. CPA argued 
that the doctrine is applicable when: 1) a party seeking 
equitable relief; 2) is guilty of conduct involving fraud, 
deceit, unconscionability, or bad faith; 3) directly related to 
the matter in issue; 4) that injures the other party; and 5) 
affects the balance of equities between the litigants. CPA 
claims that essential elements of the unclean hands 
doctrine are lacking in the instant case. 
 
In particular, CPA argued that there was no direct 
relationship between its conduct regarding the "Consent to 
Assignment" forms and its Proofs of Claim. CPA reinforces 
its argument by referring to the Supreme Court's"clean 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. This court, affirming the Castle district court on this issue, held 
that 
the district court had not abused its discretion in rejecting a claim that 
the trustees had "unclean hands." We recited that under our "limited 
scope of review on this issue [unclean hands], we cannot conclude after 
reviewing the record [in Castle v. Cohen] that the district court's 
finding 
on this point is clearly erroneous." Castle, 840 F.2d at 178. 
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hands" analysis in Keystone Driller Co. v. General 
Excavating Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933), which, among other 
elements, requires that there be an "immediate and 
necessary relationship" between the conduct and the 
matters in litigation. The Supreme Court stated: 
 
       [C]ourts of equity do not make the quality of suitors 
       the test. They apply the maxim requiring clean hands 
       only where some unconscionable act of one coming for 
       relief has immediate and necessary relation to the 
       equity that [the party] seeks in respect of the matter in 
       litigation. They do not close their doors because of 
       plaintiff 's misconduct whatever its character, that has 
       no relation to anything involved in this suit, but only 
       for such violations of conscience as in some measure 
       affect the equitable relations between the parties in 
       respect of something brought before the court for 
       adjudication. . . . They apply the maxim, not by way of 
       punishment for extraneous transgressions, but upon 
       considerations that make for the advancement of right 
       and justice. 
 
290 U.S. at 245. In Keystone, the plaintiff (Keystone) sued 
for patent infringement. In an earlier case, against different 
parties, Keystone had prevailed and its patents were 
declared valid. Keystone then used this first judgment to 
bring actions against other alleged infringers. In the second 
case, Keystone sought preliminary injunctions to protect 
the patents. The injunctions were denied, and the case 
proceeded to trial. 
 
During the course of the trial in Keystone, it was 
discovered that Keystone, in its earlier case, had concealed 
evidence which questioned and may have tainted the 
validity of the patents. Affirming the Court of Appeals, the 
Supreme Court held that this conduct by Keystone 
constituted unclean hands and barred Keystone from 
recovery. The Supreme Court stated that the earlier decree 
of validity obtained in Keystone's first case was used as the 
basis of Keystone's action in its subsequent case. Keystone, 
290 U.S. at 246. The Court inferred that "from the 
beginning it was plaintiff's intention through suppression 
of . . . evidence to obtain [a] decree in [the first case] for use 
in subsequent infringement suits against these defendants 
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and others." Id. at 247. Therefore, Keystone's misconduct 
had a direct relation to the relief sought, so as to bar 
recovery. Id. 
 
Although here CPA acknowledges that the district court 
had determined that the Consents were "immediately and 
necessarily related" to the litigation before the Bankruptcy 
Court, it argues that the district court erred in reaching 
that conclusion. CPA contends that the district court's 
conclusion that CPA lied about the assignment "was never 
`asserted' in a manner that would constitute a fraud on the 
Bankruptcy Court." 
 
CPA is persuasive in arguing that the doctrine of unclean 
hands should not be used to strip away millions of dollars 
in damages for conduct that the Bankruptcy Court had 
found was not related to CPA's claims. Indeed, CPA argues 
that unclean hands cannot be applied by way of 
punishment for an "extraneous transgression," see 
Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245, particularly where the 
"transgression" charged in this case had no relationship to 
the Moorestown lease. 
 
It must be remembered that no "Consent to Assignment" 
form had ever been executed or was claimed by CPA to 
have been executed with respect to the Moorestown lease, 
and the Moorestown lease was responsible for more than 
two-thirds of the damages awarded by the Bankruptcy  
Court.10 CPA goes on to argue that to sustain the decision 
of the district court would be to grant New Valley 
"something for nothing," i.e. possession of CPA's property 
for years without adequate payment. Such a result, CPA 
claims, is alien to principles of equity. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. A fair reading of the Bankruptcy Court's opinion reveals that the 
Bankruptcy Court was concerned only with New Valley's challenges to 
the amount of CPA's claims, i.e., whether CPA's monetary claims arising 
out of the leases were inflated. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court 
did not find it necessary to decide any issue respecting the Consents to 
Assignment but dwelt only on the rental, maintenance, and other 
monetary charges that were the subject of CPA's Proofs of Claim. Hence, 
the Bankruptcy Court concluded, as do we, that the Consents had no 
relation to the merits of CPA's claim. 
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On the other hand, New Valley claims that the district 
court was correct in holding that CPA's conduct barred any 
recovery. Referring to our decision in Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. 
Bolar Pharmaceutical Company, Inc., 747 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985), New Valley 
charges that for unclean hands to be applied against a 
party, generally all that needs to be shown are the 
following: 1) an unconscionable act; 2) that affects the 
equitable relations between the parties; 3) concerning 
something brought before the court for adjudication. New 
Valley claims that we should focus on whether a party to a 
controversy has acted in such a manner as to "shock the 
moral sensibilities of the judge," and, citing to Gaudiosi, 
269 F.2d at 882, contends that CPA's conduct was directly 
related to the claims at issue in the litigation. New Valley 
contends that merely because CPA abandoned its 
"fraudulent" claim before trial does not mean that its hands 
became clean after years of having advanced a theory in 
motion practice and discovery that both the Bankruptcy 
and district courts later discredited as a sham. 
 
New Valley argued that what "CPA sought was afinding 
that FSI . . . was liable to it for damages under the leases; 
the proofs of claim were filed against New Valley in the 
event that CPA was unsuccessful in establishing FSI's 
liability."11 New Valley charged that to obtain that relief, 
CPA manufactured evidence and pursued a theory it knew 
to be false. "Moreover, CPA's conduct posed an enormous 
monetary risk to New Valley because New Valley was 
obligated to indemnify FSI against any liability under the 
Reno Lease."12 
 
Relying upon Keystone, New Valley argued before us that 
there is a broader standard of when conduct is "related" for 
purposes of unclean hands. New Valley emphasized that 
CPA backdated documents and filed fraudulent proofs of 
claim before the Bankruptcy Court, and contended"[i]t 
strains credulity to accept CPA's contention that it 
backdated documents and manufactured evidence to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. New Valley Br. at 30. 
 
12. Id. at 31. 
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Although the parties disputed the applicability of 
equitable defenses to legal claims in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, we are far more concerned with the critical 
element of the unclean hands doctrine, i.e., the relationship 
between the challenged conduct of CPA pertaining to the 
Consents, and the rental and other monies sought by CPA 
as a result of the Reno and Moorestown leases. First and 
foremost, we are convinced by the Bankruptcy Court's 
findings and its conclusion that the Consents had no 
"immediate and necessary" relationship to the Proofs of 
Claim. The Proofs of Claims filed by CPA, by their own 
terms, reserved for litigation the dispute as to assignment 
of the leases. Inasmuch as the Bankruptcy Court'sfindings 
were not held by the district court to be clearly erroneous, 
nor can they be so held by us, those findings could not 
trigger the doctrine of unclean hands under our standard of 
review. 
 
In our view, the primary principle guiding application of 
the unclean hands doctrine is that the alleged inequitable 
conduct must be connected, i.e., have a relationship, to the 
matters before the court for resolution. We will not refuse 
relief to a party merely because it has engaged in 
misconduct which is unrelated to its claims before the 
court. Only when "some unconscionable act of one coming 
for relief has immediate and necessary relation to the equity 
that" the party seeks, will the doctrine bar recovery. 
Keystone, 290 U.S. at 245. Here of course those issues 
involved CPA's Proofs of Claim which sought payment for 
monies due under New Valley's leases. 
 
As an equitable doctrine, application of unclean hands 
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, 
e.g., Ciba-Geigy, 747 F.2d at 855 (refusing to apply unclean 
hands). Moreover, neither we nor the Supreme Court has 
required, as argued by New Valley, that application of the 
unclean hands doctrine is mandatory. The precedents that 
we find controlling make clear that there must be a 
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relationship between the inequitable conduct and the 
claims brought before the court in order for the doctrine to 
apply; even then, the court has discretion to limit the reach 
of the doctrine to only some of the claims. See , e.g., 
Keystone, 290 U.S. 240; Ciba-Geigy, 747 F.2d 844. 
 
The Supreme Court in Keystone held that"when 
assessing whether to invoke the doctrine of unclean hands, 
courts of equity must not be bound by formula or 
restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel the free 
and just exercise of discretion." 290 U.S. at 245-46. When 
applying the doctrine, the courts in this Circuit have 
generally been clear that the connection between the 
misconduct and the claim must be close. For example, in 
Monsanto v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972), this Court upheld a judgment 
declaring a Monsanto patent invalid and unenforceable. 
456 F.2d at 594. The Court found that Monsanto had 
misrepresented the properties of its product (a herbicide) in 
order to obtain a patent, although a claim for the same 
product had been rejected in an earlier patent application. 
Id. at 596-97. The claim of infringement brought by 
Monsanto therefore directly depended upon Monsanto's 
misrepresentations of Monsanto's own patent, thereby 
providing the essential relationship for application of the 
doctrine. Thus, this court, after citing to Keystone, id. at 
598, found that the district court was correct in concluding 
Monsanto had come to court with unclean hands. 
Monsanto, 456 F.2d at 600. 
 
Where this Court has not applied unclean hands, the 
misconduct alleged has not been directly related to the 
subject of the plaintiff 's suit. In Ciba-Geigy, we upheld the 
district court's grant of a permanent injunction in favor of 
Ciba despite allegations that Ciba had unclean hands. The 
district court found that evidence that Ciba had mislabelled 
drugs, sold adulterated batches of drugs and violated FDA 
regulations was insufficient to warrant application of 
unclean hands, as it did not involve nor relate to the matter 
of Ciba's claims against Bolar. Ciba-Geigy, 747 F.2d at 855. 
See also Northeast Women's Ctr. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 
1342, 1354 (3d Cir.) (reversing the district court's ruling 
that unclean hands had precluded Northeast from 
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obtaining an injunction against the defendants because 
Northeast's alleged misconduct (violation of health 
regulations) had no relationship to the defendants' acts in 
interfering with Northeast's claims), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
901 (1989); General Dev. Corp. v. Binstein, 743 F. Supp. 
1115, 1136 (D.N.J. 1990) (refusing to apply unclean hands 
despite evidence that General Development was a general 
"malefactor" because that evidence did not relate directly to 
the misrepresentations alleged in the complaint). 
 
The two cases relied on most heavily by the parties are 
not to the contrary. As we have noted, Keystone, while 
holding that unclean hands precluded the plaintiff 
(Keystone) from the relief it sought, nevertheless requires 
an "immediate and necessary" relationship between the 
conduct and the claims at issue. In Keystone, that 
relationship was found to be present, and hence, the 
Supreme Court upheld application of the doctrine. 
 
In Gaudiosi, this court applied the doctrine of unclean 
hands in a proxy contest context. Our court upheld the 
determination of the district court that Gaudiosi had tried 
to "intimidate" a set of investors by sending a letter to them 
in order to influence their votes. In doing so, Gaudiosi had 
violated SEC solicitation regulations. Gaudiosi, 269 F.2d at 
879. While our court focussed on the integrity of the court 
when faced with an assertion of inequitable conduct, and 
while we explicitly stated that no injury needed to be 
shown, id. at 881-82, it is crystal clear from the facts of the 
case that Gaudiosi's misconduct -- the intimidation of 
shareholders -- was directly related to the case before the 
court, which concerned the validity of a corporate election. 
 
Given these precedents and their uniform requirement of 
an "immediate and necessary" relationship between the 
challenged conduct and the claims for relief, we cannot 
sustain the district court's decision in this case, where that 
relationship is absent. The district court implicitly agreed 
with the Bankruptcy Court's determination that there was 
little connection between the Consents and CPA's claims. 
The district court, while emphasizing the actions of CPA in 
backdating the Consents to Assignment, at no time 
suggested that a direct relationship ever existed between 
CPA's conduct and CPA's Proofs of Claim. 
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Rather, in its opinion, the district court stated three 
reasons why unclean hands should prevent the recovery of 
monies by CPA. First, CPA had alleged a consent to 
assignment theory that it knew to be untrue; second, the 
testimony of Jones concerning the Consents strongly 
indicated a "selective memory;" and third, CPA misleadingly 
implied that it was confused as to which entity was CPA's 
tenant. It did so, despite some information in CPA's 
possession that indicated New Valley had remained CPA's 
tenant. 
 
However, none of the issues which the parties disputed 
and which pertained to the Moorestown property were 
connected with the Consents to Assignment, and it was 
those issues that accounted for two-thirds of CPA's claims. 
The Consents, as noted earlier, related only to the 
Bridgeton and Reno leases. Moreover, the Consents simply 
have no relationship to CPA's claims for monies against 
New Valley arising out of New Valley's tenancy of Reno. 
Even more so, the Consents had no direct relationship to 
CPA's claims concerning Bridgeton. Those claims, as we 
have noted, had been settled earlier. Yet, the district court's 
reasons focus almost exclusively on the issue of the 
Consents. 
 
Nor do the Proofs of Claim support the district court's 
holding. Indeed, under the district court's analysis, it is 
difficult to imagine what different or alternative language 
CPA could have used in its Proofs of Claim to reserve any 
of its rights against New Valley. The Proofs of Claim merely 
set forth the fact that CPA and New Valley had differing 
interpretations concerning the status of the leases. Had 
CPA waited until the assignment issue had been litigated, 
it would have been out of time in presenting its bankruptcy 
claims against New Valley. 
 
We hold that the Bankruptcy Court (1) applied the 
correct legal standard, drawn from Keystone and Gaudiosi, 
which established the principle of direct relationship in the 
cases we have cited, and (2) was not clearly erroneous in its 
factfinding, when it concluded that there was no immediate 
and necessary relationship between New Valley's assertion 
of unclean hands and CPA's claims. 
 




We will therefore reverse the Order of the district court 
dated July 13, 1998, and remand to the district court for 
further proceedings (see, e.g., note 8, supra) consistent with 
this opinion. 
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